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Contesting Childhood in the U.S. Justice System: The Transfer of
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CHILD RES. 461 (2005).
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6. Assessing the overall effect of the legislative changes is difficult
given data limitations and decreases in juvenile crime. See JEFFREY
FAGAN & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO CRIMINAL COURT (2000); and
In the 1980s and 1990s, nearly every state enacted legislativechanges that eased the process of treating juveniles asadults. Scholars seeking to understand the consequences of
these changes have found evidence of an increase in the num-
ber of juveniles transferred to criminal court and sentenced as
adults. As part of this increase, the number of juveniles receiv-
ing sentences of life without the opportunity for parole
(LWOP) rose substantially. In fact, a large majority of the
approximately 2,600 individuals serving LWOP sentences for
crimes committed as juveniles (under age 18) were sentenced
over the last several decades. LWOP sentences for juveniles,
which preclude the possibility of release at any point except
through clemency or a pardon, have drawn a considerable
amount of criticism and have been the focus of a great deal of
litigation and policy-reform efforts. Responding to this criti-
cism, the United States Supreme Court issued two decisions
over the last few years limiting the extent to which juveniles
can receive LWOP sentences, Graham v. Florida1 and Miller v.
Alabama.2 Despite these decisions, numerous questions remain
regarding the appropriate and allowable levels of punishment
for young offenders that courts and legislatures will continue
to grapple with for the foreseeable future. 
This article explores these questions through an examina-
tion of the legal and legislative landscape of LWOP sentences
for juveniles in light of these decisions. Part I begins with a dis-
cussion of the broader context of legislative changes that eased
the process of treating juveniles as adults and the conse-
quences of the changes. Part II shifts to a discussion of
Supreme Court decisions on the death penalty for juveniles
that provide the foundation for the Graham and Miller deci-
sions, with a specific focus on the Court’s decision in Roper v.
Simmons.3 Part III discusses the Graham decision and the sig-
nificance of the Court’s decision to extend its analysis in Roper
outside of the death-penalty context. Part IV then turns to the
Miller decision, providing an analysis of the decision and a dis-
cussion of several issues that courts and legislatures are grap-
pling with following Graham and Miller. In particular, we will
discuss how courts have treated the question of virtual LWOP,
term-of-year sentences that are the functional equivalent of life
without parole for juveniles. In addition, in Part V, we will
focus on the response of courts and legislatures specifically to
Miller in light of its ban on mandatory LWOP sentences. This
part will focus on Pennsylvania, the state with the most indi-
viduals serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as juve-
niles. In the immediate aftermath of Miller, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court heard two cases regarding the implementation
of Miller, and the Pennsylvania General Assembly has passed
legislation to bring the state in line with Miller. The article will
conclude by highlighting key issues that need to be addressed
by courts and legislatures going forward.       
I. THE SHIFTING BOUNDARY BETWEEN JUVENILE AND
CRIMINAL COURTS
Although transfer provisions vary considerably across states,
during the 1980s and 1990s, every state changed their transfer
laws to facilitate the process of treating juveniles as adults.4
These changes have generally served to lower or eliminate the
minimum age of eligibility to be treated as an adult, to expand
the offenses eligible for adult treatment, to move waiver criteria
toward offense-based characteristics, to shift discretion from
judges to prosecutors, and to create additional avenues to han-
dle juvenile offenders in the justice systems.5 The result of these
changes has been a transformation of the boundary between
juvenile and criminal courts, and, as a result, an increase in the
number of juveniles being treated as adults.6
Given these developments, researchers have sought to iden-
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http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/annual-reports.
9. Bishop, supra note 6. See also Irene Y.H. Ng, Rosemary C. Sarri,
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1 (2005).
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ECONOMICS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD (Sheldon Danziger & Cecilia
Rouse eds., 2007); Christopher Uggen & Sara Wakefield, Young
Adults Reentering the Community from the Criminal Justice System:
The Challenge of Becoming an Adult, in ON YOUR OWN WITHOUT A
NET: THE TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
(D. Wayne Osgood, E. Michael Foster, Constance Flanagan, &
Gretchen R. Ruth eds., 2005).
11. See ROBERT HAHN, ANGELA MCGOWAN, AKIVA LIEBERMAN, ALEX
CROSBY, MINDY FULLILOVE, ROBERT JOHNSON, EVE MOSCICKI,
LESHAWNDRA PRICE, SUSAN SNYDER, FARRIS TUMA, JESSICA LOWY,
PETER BRISS, STELLA CORY, & GLENDA STONE, EFFECTS ON VIOLENCE
OF LAWS AND POLICIES FACILITATING THE TRANSFER OF YOUTH FROM
THE JUVENILE TO THE ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM: A REPORT ON
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PREVENTIVE
SERVICES (2007), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION;
and RICHARD E. REDDING, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE
DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (2008) for
reviews of the general and specific deterrent effects of these leg-
islative changes. 
12. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES
FROM 2005 TO 2010 REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM, available at http://www.campaignforyouth
justice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf.
13. See supra notes 7-8.
14. See id.; see also Shook, supra note 4.
15. Id.
tify the effects of these changes on both youth and society.
Despite the rhetoric of the legislative changes of the 1980s and
1990s, it is clear from the evidence that the vast majority of
young people sentenced in criminal court do not receive sen-
tences that extend far into their adulthood.7 In fact, there is
significant evidence that large percentages of young people
convicted in the criminal court are placed on probation, sen-
tenced to a term of months in local jails, or receive prison sen-
tences that are not much longer than the punishments avail-
able in the juvenile justice system.8 This is problematic
because youth in the criminal justice system are less likely to
receive programs and services, are subject to higher rates of
victimization, and experience worse mental-health outcomes.9
Thus, it is clear that, when treated as adults, many juveniles are
essentially receiving the same sentence that they could other-
wise receive in the juvenile system without sufficient programs
and services. In addition, being convicted in an adult criminal
court means that a youth is likely to have a felony record, a
result that has a detrimental effect on his or her life opportu-
nities; other studies have found that incarceration during ado-
lescence and early adulthood has negative consequences for
the transition to adulthood.10 For example, numerous studies
have also found that transferred juveniles are more likely to
recidivate than youth retained in the juvenile justice system,
calling into question the public-safety consequences of sen-




In light of the findings dis-
cussed above, some states are
reconsidering their transfer
policies, and a number have
enacted new policies regarding
the transfer of young people to,
and the treatment of young peo-
ple in, the criminal justice sys-
tem.12 One area that has
received a great deal of attention is the issue of LWOP sen-
tences for juveniles. As discussed previously, the vast majority
of young people convicted in criminal court do not receive
long sentences.13 This is, in large part, a reflection of the real-
ity that transfer to criminal court is not limited to juveniles
who commit the most violent and serious offenses, and that
the legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s broadened the
population of youth subject to transfer to criminal court.14 At
the same time, a common thread of these legislative changes
was a trend to remove discretion from judges for deciding
whether youth charged with specific offenses, often violent
crimes, should be transferred to criminal court.15 The impetus
behind these changes was, in most respects, the desire to
increase the number of these youth who were transferred to










18. See SECOND CHANCES 4 YOUTH, BASIC DECENCY: PROTECTING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2012), for a discussion of trends in
the sentencing of juveniles to LWOP. See ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S.
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19. See Jeffrey J. Shook, Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without the
Opportunity for Parole, in HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY (Elena L. Grigorenko ed., 2012).
20. Id. This means that juveniles in these states were sentenced to
LWOP without consideration of factors such as developmental
status, family circumstances, and a variety of other factors that
could mitigate against LWOP. In many states, the combination of
mandatory transfer and mandatory sentencing provisions
removed judicial discretion entirely from the decision-making
process.
21. Id. See also petitioner’s brief in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v.
Hobbes for a discussion of differences between mandatory and dis-
cretionary states.
22. See Linda E. Frost Clausel & Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Justice on
Appeal, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER
OF ADOLESCENTS TO CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000).
23. Id.
24. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
25. Id. The decision was 5-3, and the majority opinion was written by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment. 
26. Id. at 830.
27. Id. at 832.
28. Id. at 836-837.
29. Id.
and sentenced in criminal
court.16
A review of the evidence
on transfer and sentencing
reveals that this intent was
realized.17 With regard to
LWOP, the number of juve-
niles receiving these sen-
tences began to rise in the
mid-1980s and rose substan-
tially until peaking and
beginning to decline in the
late 1990s and into the 2000s.18 One reason for this increase
was the nature of criminal-court sentencing policy. Because
most state sentencing provisions do not distinguish between
juveniles and adults in criminal court, juveniles are subject to
the same sentences as adults.19 In the majority of states that
allow juveniles to receive life without the opportunity for
parole sentences, LWOP is mandatory upon conviction of spe-
cific offenses.20 While LWOP sentences for juveniles increased
both in states with discretionary and with mandatory sentenc-
ing provisions, the rate of LWOP sentences differed substan-
tially, as states with mandatory sentencing provisions sen-
tenced juveniles to LWOP at significantly higher rates than
states with discretionary sentencing provisions.21 Thus, it is
apparent that the combination of changing laws and manda-
tory transfer and sentencing structures account for a large pro-
portion of juveniles sentenced to LWOP.   
II. THE ROAD TO MILLER: THE DEATH PENALTY
Based on the evidence, there is strong support for the con-
clusion that the legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s
have had a range of negative and harmful consequences for
both young people and society. Despite this conclusion and the
reality that those legislative changes reflected a fairly dramatic
departure in juvenile justice policy and practice, courts gener-
ally did not strike down provisions allowing juveniles to be
punished similarly to adults.22 The limited legal intervention,
in large part, is rooted in a state’s general authority to establish
and regulate its juvenile justice system, especially with regard
to determining who is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
justice system.23
In the late 1980s, however, the United States Supreme
Court did decide two cases pertaining to the punishment of
juvenile offenders. These cases considered the question of
whether it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishment to execute individuals
convicted of crimes that occurred before their 18th birthday. In
the first case, Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional to execute someone who was less than 16
years old at the time of his or her offense.24 The case involved
a 15-year-old named William Thompson who was convicted of
murder in Oklahoma. 
In reaching its decision, the majority applied the “evolving-
standards-of-decency test” and determined that there was a
national consensus against executing individuals under the age
of 16 at the time of their offense.25 In particular, the Court
found that 18 states that allowed the death penalty, in addition
to the 14 states that did not, prohibited it for individuals under
the age of 16 to support the “conclusion that it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less
than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense.”26 The Court
also determined that the rarity in which the penalty was
applied to individuals under 16 evidenced that this penalty
was “abhorrent to conscience of the community.”27 In addi-
tion, the Court asserted that because of a juvenile’s “lesser cul-
pability, as well as the teenager’s capacity for growth and soci-
ety’s fiduciary obligations to its children, the retributive pur-
pose underlying the death penalty is simply inapplicable to the
execution of a 15-year-old offender.”28 Similarly, the Court rea-
soned that a youth’s status reduced the deterrent justification
for the death penalty.29
A year later, the Supreme Court decided a second case
regarding the execution of juveniles involving a 16-year-old
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30. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
31. Id. The majority decision was written by Justice Scalia and joined
by Chief Justice Renhquist and Justices White and Kennedy.
Justice O’Connor concurred that there was not a national consen-
sus against executing 16- and 17-year-olds.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
35. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
36. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
37. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
38. See State ex. rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
39. Id.
40. Id. In particular, the majority decision cited an article by Elizabeth
Scott and Laurence Steinberg examining whether evidence from
research on adolescent development mitigated against the death
penalty for juveniles. The majority also relied on amicus briefs sub-
mitted by the American Psychological Association, the American
Medical Association, and other organizations to draw its conclu-
sions regarding differences between juveniles and adults.
41. Id. at 569-570.
42. Id. The Court considered whether the execution of minors was
supported by four penological interests: deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Based on its conclusions
regarding differences between juveniles and adults, the majority
determined that penological interests underlying the use of the
death penalty did not support the execution of juveniles.   
43. Id. at 573. In rejecting this approach, the majority argued that “dif-
ferences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability.” The majority
expressed concern that “an unacceptable likelihood exists that the
brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of
course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence
less severe than death.” It also questioned the ability of psycholo-
gists to “differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 
44. Id. at 575.
convicted of murder. In the decision, Stanford v. Kentucky, the
majority opinion held that it was permissible under the Eighth
Amendment to execute an individual who was 16 or 17 years
old at the time of his or her offense.30 Unlike in Thompson, the
majority found that there was not a national consensus against
executing 16- and 17-year-olds.31 Further, the majority
rejected the argument relied upon in Thompson that the reluc-
tance of juries to impose the death penalty on 16- and 17-year-
olds was evidence of a consensus against the punishment.32
The majority opinion also rejected arguments regarding the
reduced culpability for young people as a basis for finding the
death penalty for 16- and 17-year-olds unconstitutional.33
Thus, although the Court was willing to prohibit the death
penalty for those under the age of 16, it was not willing to draw
a line prohibiting the death penalty for all juveniles.
ROPER V. SIMMONS
The Supreme Court revisited this issue less than two
decades later when it decided the case of Roper v. Simmons.34
The decision to hear Roper came soon after the Court decided
another case regarding the death penalty. This case, Atkins v.
Virginia, addressed whether it was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to execute someone who was mentally retarded.35
Similar to the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court had
found that it was constitutional to do so in a case decided in
1989.36 In Atkins, however, a majority of the Court found that
there was evidence of a societal consensus against executing
the mentally retarded and raised the potential of another chal-
lenge to the juvenile death penalty.37
Roper, decided just three years after Atkins, involved 17-
year-old Christopher Simmons who was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death in Missouri. Simmons
appealed his sentence, and the Missouri Supreme Court ruled
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.38 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the case in
March 2005. The majority decision relied on the fact that since
Stanford, 5 states had abolished the death penalty for juve-
niles—joining the 30 states that
did not allow for the execution
of juveniles—in finding that
there was a societal consensus
against executing juveniles.39 In
addition to this analysis, the
majority opinion assessed other
evidence to support its deci-
sion, extending its reasoning in
Thompson regarding the
reduced culpability of juveniles
and their capacity to change.40 Specifically, the majority used
this evidence to draw three conclusions regarding differences
between juveniles and adults: (1) juveniles possessed “‘[a] lack
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’”
that often leads to “‘impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions’”; (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure”; and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as an adult.”41
These conclusions led the Court to reason that juveniles
were not as culpable or blameworthy as adults, and it therefore
determined that they could not reliably be classified among the
worst offenders and that executing juveniles was not supported
by penological interests.42 Thus, the majority enacted a cate-
gorical rule prohibiting the execution of someone for a crime he
or she committed under the age of 18. Although the dissents
argued that the individualized approach used by courts in
death-penalty decisions was adequate to account for differences
between juveniles and adults, the majority rejected this
approach.43 The majority also noted the contradictions that
exist in denying juveniles the rights of citizenship (e.g., right to
vote, sit on juries, etc.) but subjecting them to the most severe
penalties administered by the state.44 Finally, it used interna-
tional law to justify its decision by noting the “stark reality that
the United States is the only country in the world that contin-
ues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty” and
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46. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Sullivan v. Florida was
a companion case that was not decided because of procedural




49. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61.
50. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024.
51. Id. at 2026.
52. Id. at 2027.
53. Id. at 2030 (“. . . penological theory is not adequate to justify life
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders”). The major-
ity also used international law as part of its analysis and con-
cluded that the U.S. was the only country to sentence juveniles to
LWOP. It did so based on the rationale that it “has treated the laws
and practices of other nations and international agreements as rel-
evant to the Eighth Amendment not because those norms are
binding or controlling but because the judgment of the world’s
nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with
basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale
has respected reasoning to support it.” Id.
54. See id. at 2036 (“I agree with the Court that Terrance Graham’s
sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ Unlike the
majority, however, I see no need to invent a new constitutional
rule of dubious provenance in reaching that conclusion. Instead,
my analysis is based on an application of this Court’s precedents,
in particular (1) our cases requiring ‘narrow proportionality’
review of noncapital sentences and (2) our conclusion in Roper v.
Simmons [citation omitted] that juvenile offenders are generally
less culpable than adults who commit the same crimes.”).
55. Id.
56. Id.
the fact that the juvenile death
penalty is prohibited in inter-
national treaties and conven-
tions.45
In declaring that juveniles
are “categorically less culpa-
ble than adults,” the Roper
decision presented a strong
rationale for treating juve-
niles differently and, at least
symbolically, called into ques-
tion sentencing schemes that
treated juveniles similarly to
adults. Yet Supreme Court jurisprudence has traditionally
treated the death penalty differently, meaning that death-
penalty decisions generally did not apply outside of that con-
text. Thus, questions remained regarding whether and how
Roper would be applied to other sentences for young people.
III. NEXT STEP ON THE ROAD: BANNING LWOP FOR
NONHOMICIDE OFFENSES
Following Roper, many individuals serving LWOP or other
long sentences for crimes committed as juveniles challenged
their convictions. Most of these challenges, however, were
denied because courts determined that Roper did not apply
outside of the death-penalty context. The Supreme Court,
however, granted certiorari in two cases in 2009: Graham v.
Florida46 and Sullivan v. Florida. The issue considered by the
Court in Graham and Sullivan was whether, pursuant to an
Eighth Amendment analysis, it was cruel and unusual punish-
ment to sentence a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide
offense to LWOP.47 Building upon its analysis in Roper, the
majority decision enacted a categorical rule prohibiting LWOP
sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses
based on its determination that such a sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.48 In reaching this decision, the
majority used the evolving-standards-of-decency analysis49
and concluded that there was a societal consensus against the
punishment because despite the fact that LWOP sentences
were available in 37 states (plus the District of Columbia and
federal government), only 11 states had sentenced a juvenile to
LWOP for a nonhomicide offense and only 123 juveniles had
ever been sentenced to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.50
Similar to Roper, the Graham decision was based on a
review of existing research regarding adolescent development.
Based on its review of the research, the majority asserted: 
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the
Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juve-
niles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show funda-
mental differences between juvenile and adult minds.
For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior
control continue to mature through late adolescence.51
Based on the reduced culpability of juveniles and a long
recognition that those “who do not kill, intend to kill, or fore-
see that life will be taken are less deserving of the most serious
forms of punishment than are murderers,” the majority rea-
soned that, “[i]t follows that, when compared to an adult mur-
derer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has
a twice diminished moral culpability.”52
Given the severity of the sentence—life in prison without
the possibility of release—the Court considered whether it met
penological goals and concluded that because juveniles are less
culpable than adults and have more potential for change, sen-
tencing juveniles to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses could not
be justified through these goals.53 Interestingly, Chief Justice
Roberts concurred in the decision in Graham. In a separate
opinion, he argued that while he did not agree with the cate-
gorical rule advanced by the majority, he did believe that the
LWOP sentence was not proportional in the case of Terrance
Graham.54 He proposed a case-by-case “narrow proportional-
ity” analysis, accounting for an “offender’s juvenile status,” to
determine whether the punishment is proportional to the
crime. In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts
asserted, “Roper’s conclusion that juveniles are typically less
culpable than adults has pertinence beyond capital cases, and
rightly informs the case-specific inquiry I believe to be appro-
priate here.”55 As noted, the majority rejected this approach
and adopted a categorical rule in large part because of the dif-
ficulty in making this determination while an individual was
still a juvenile.56
28 Court Review - Volume 49 
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goals . . . .
Like Roper, Graham was a momentous decision. Not only
did it confirm and extend the findings from Roper regarding
differences between juveniles and adults, it also extended this
rationale to create a categorical rule banning a punishment
outside of the death-penalty context. The question, then, was
how Graham would be implemented and whether it would be
extended to other categories of cases or punishments. 
IV. WHERE WE ARE TODAY: MILLER V. ALABAMA AND
JACKSON V. HOBBS
On June 25, 2012, the Court announced its decision in
Miller v. Alabama and its companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,
thereby fundamentally altering the landscape of juvenile sen-
tencing law in the United States. Finding that “imposition of a
State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot pro-
ceed as though they were not children,”57 the Court built on its
Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence in
Thompson, Roper, and Graham by finding mandatory LWOP
sentences unconstitutional for youth under the age of 18. The
following section provides a brief analysis of the Miller deci-
sion and, using Pennsylvania as a case study, discusses how
one state has sought to bring itself into compliance with Miller.
THE CASES 
Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson, both 14 years old when
they were convicted of murder, suffered traumatic life experi-
ences before they were sentenced to mandatory terms of life in
prison without the possibility of parole. In Miller’s case, he was
charged and convicted of first-degree murder and arson. In
Jackson’s case, he was charged and convicted of felony murder
for his role as a lookout and non-triggerman in an armed rob-
bery gone awry.
KUNTRELL JACKSON
Kuntrell Jackson was raised in an abusive and impoverished
Arkansas household with significant exposure to gun violence.
“Kuntrell’s mother was sent to prison for shooting and injuring
a neighbor when Kuntrell was about six years old. When
Kuntrell was about thirteen years old, his older brother [] was
also imprisoned for shooting someone. Not long after this,
[Kuntrell’s abusive father figure] left the family; two of
Kuntrell’s teenage sisters became pregnant; and several other
relatives were incarcerated.”58 In 1999, Jackson and two other
boys decided to rob a video store. Upon learning that one of
the other boys was carrying a sawed-off shotgun, Jackson
decided to stay outside when the other boys entered the store.
There was a struggle with the
storekeeper, Jackson entered
the store, and when the store-
keeper threatened to call the
police, one of the other boys
shot and killed her. The three
boys fled empty-handed.59
The prosecutor in Jackson’s
case exercised his authority to
charge Jackson as an adult,60
and Jackson was charged with
capital felony murder and
aggravated robbery. The trial
court denied his motion to
transfer the case to juvenile
court, and an appellate court
affirmed.61 A jury then convicted Jackson of both crimes, and
the judge sentenced Jackson to LWOP, the only statutorily avail-
able sentence.62 Jackson did not challenge the sentence on
appeal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tions. Two years later, Jackson filed a state petition for habeas
corpus, challenging his sentence under Roper v. Simmons and
then under Graham v. Florida. The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Jackson’s petition, find-
ing that “Roper and Graham were ‘narrowly tailored’ to their
contexts: ‘death-penalty cases involving a juvenile and life-
imprisonment-without-parole cases for nonhomicide offenses
involving a juvenile.’”63
EVAN MILLER
Evan Miller grew up “in and out of foster care because his
mother suffered from alcoholism and drug addiction and his
stepfather abused him. Miller, too, regularly used drugs and
alcohol; and he had attempted suicide four times, the first
when he was six years old.”64 In Miller’s case, the crime
occurred one evening, after the victim, Cole Cannon, came to
Miller’s home to make a drug deal with Miller’s mother. Miller
and a friend followed Cannon back to his trailer and spent the
rest of the night smoking marijuana and playing drinking
games. When Cannon passed out, Miller and his friend took
money from his wallet. When Miller tried to put the wallet
back into Cannon’s pocket, Cannon awoke, and a fight
ensued, during which Miller struck Cannon repeatedly with a
baseball bat. In an attempt to cover up their crime, the two
boys set fire to Cannon’s trailer, and Cannon eventually died
from his injuries and from smoke inhalation.65 As the Court
57. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012).
58. Jackson’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2011 WL 5322575, at 4-
5, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10–9647) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
59. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
60. Justice Kagan notes, “Arkansas law gives prosecutors discretion to
charge 14-year-olds as adults when they are alleged to have com-
mitted certain serious offenses.” Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
27-318(c)(2) (1998)). 
61. Id. (citing Jackson v. State, No. 02-535, 2003 WL 193413 at 1
(Ark. App., 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-318(d), (e)).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (1997) (“A defendant convicted
of capital murder or treason shall be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment without parole.”). Because Jackson was ineligible
for the death penalty under Thompson, 485 U.S. 815, the only
available sentencing option was life imprisonment without parole.
63. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49,
____S.W. 3____, at 5 (2012)).
64. Id. at 2462 (citing E.J.M. v. State, 928 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2004) (Cobb, J., concurring in result)); App. in No.
10-9646, pp. 26-28).
65. Id.
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66. Id. at 2462-63.
67. Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor. Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion focused
on the felony-murder rule, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.
Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Thomas and Alito, filed
dissenting opinions in which Justice Scalia joined.
68. Id. at 2463.
69. Id. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011;
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding imposition of
death penalty for nonhomicide offenses unconstitutional); Atkins,
536 U.S. 304 (finding Eighth Amendment violation in the impo-
sition of death penalty on mentally retarded defendants).
70. Id. at 2464 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
71. Id. See also id. at 2465, n. 5 (“The evidence presented to us in
these cases indicates that the science and social science support-
ing Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even
stronger.”). 
72. Id. at 2465.
73. See, e.g., id. at 2464-65 (Noting the unique juvenile capacity for
rehabilitation: “[Scientific] findings—of transient rashness, pro-
clivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both less-
ened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that
as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his ‘“defi-
ciencies will be reformed.”’” (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2027).
74. Id. at 2466.
75. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory death sentence for
first-degree murder on Eighth Amendment grounds).
76. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,
74-76 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-112
(1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597-609).
77. Id. at 2467-68.
noted in the Miller decision, 
Alabama law required
that Miller initially be
charged as a juvenile, but
allowed the District
Attorney to seek removal
of the case to adult court.
[ ] The D.A. did so, and
the juvenile court agreed
to transfer after a hearing.
. . . The State accordingly charged Miller as an adult with
murder in the course of arson. That crime (like capital
murder in Arkansas) carries a mandatory minimum
punishment of life without parole. [Citations omitted.]
Relying in significant part on testimony from [Miller’s
friend], who had pleaded to a lesser offense, a jury found
Miller guilty. . . . The Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed . . . [and the] Alabama Supreme Court
denied review.66
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases—Miller
on direct appeal and Jackson on collateral review.
THE DECISION 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice
Elena Kagan, declared Miller and Jackson’s mandatory LWOP
sentences unconstitutional.67 Justice Kagan’s analysis in the
Miller decision is rooted in the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and rests on the convergence of “two strands of
precedent reflecting [the Court’s] concern with proportionate
punishment.”68 The first line relates to “categorical bans on
sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpa-
bility of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty.”69 The
second line stems from cases prohibiting the mandatory impo-
sition of capital punishment, “requiring that sentencing
authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the
details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”70
The Court focuses on the fundamental developmental dif-
ferences between youth and adults to establish the dispropor-
tionality of mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles and the
corresponding need for individualized sentencing of youth
convicted of murder. In setting forth the key aspect of the
opinion, Kagan builds on the premise established by the Roper
and Graham decisions—that, based on continuously evolving
science and social-science research, “children are constitution-
ally different than adults for purposes of sentencing.”71
As in Roper and Graham, the Miller decision underscores
the lack of any penological justification for “imposing the
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they com-
mit terrible crimes.”72 To reach this conclusion, the Court
reviewed its previous analyses of retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation in the juvenile-sentencing context and found
that none of the traditional penological rationales support the
existence of mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles.73
The Court further relied on its line of reasoning in Graham
by likening LWOP sentences for juveniles to the death penalty
itself.74 Looking to Woodson v. North Carolina75 and its progeny,
which call for individualized sentencing and the ability to con-
sider mitigating factors in capital cases,76 the Miller Court
argues that the same rationale should be extended to juveniles
facing the state’s harshest available penalty. In extending
Woodson’s rationale to the juvenile-sentencing context, Miller
mandates sentencing processes tailored to account for the dis-
tinct attributes of youth:
In light of Graham’s reasoning, these [death-penalty]
decisions too show the flaws of imposing mandatory life-
without-parole sentences on juvenile homicide offend-
ers. Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude
a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and
the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant
to it. Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive the
same sentence as every other—the 17-year-old and the
14-year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child
from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and
abusive one. . . . So Graham and Roper and our individu-
alized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a
State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if
he treats every child as an adult.77
Accordingly, to comply with Miller, states must implement
processes and procedures reflective of the substantive change to
sentencing law. By extending traditional death-penalty sentenc-






and adults . . . .
78. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-
Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences,
A.B.A. J., Aug 8, 2012, available at http://www.abajournal.com/
n e w s / a r t i c l e / c h e m e r i n s k y _ j u v e n i l e _ l i f e - w i t h o u t -
parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/ (noting that the
inability to mandatorily impose life without parole sentences on
juveniles “will necessitate a penalty phase after conviction to
make [the sentencing] decision. After the Supreme Court held
that there cannot be a mandatory death sentence in homicide
cases, the practice of the penalty phase developed for a determi-
nation of whether capital punishment is warranted based on the
facts in each case. The same type of penalty phase will be required
when life without parole is sought for a homicide crime commit-
ted by a juvenile”).
79. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
80. Id. at 2469.
81. Marsha Levick, From a Trilogy to a Quadrilogy: Miller v. Alabama
Makes It Four in a Row For U.S. Supreme Court Cases That Support
Differential Treatment of Youth, 91 CRIM. L. REP. 748 (2012).
82. Chemerinsky, supra note 78.
83. Another question involves the current status of cases where juve-
niles were sentenced to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses. Because
Graham found the sentences of juveniles serving LWOP for non-
homicide offenses unconstitutional, those individuals needed to
be resentenced. Most courts determined that Graham did apply
retroactively to juveniles already serving LWOP for nonhomicide
offenses. While individuals were sentenced to LWOP for non-
homicide offenses in 12 states, the vast majority were serving their
sentences in Florida and Louisiana. Drawing conclusions about
the outcomes of resentencing hearings is difficult because there is
no comprehensive analysis of the outcomes available and many
cases have still not been resentenced. 
84. People v. Caballero, 55 Cal. 4th 262 (Cal. 2012).
85. Id. at 273 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). 
ing procedures to the juvenile-sentencing context, the Miller
decision creates a requirement of individualized sentencing
hearings and review of mitigating circumstances whenever
juveniles charged as adults are facing LWOP sentences.78 To aid
the lower courts’ review of such mitigating factors, as applied to
juveniles, the Court outlined the factors a sentencer must con-
sider, including: (1) the youth’s “chronological age” and related
“immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”; (2) the youth’s “family and home environment
that surrounds him”; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide
offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct
and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him;”
(4) “the incompetencies associated with youth—for example,
his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (includ-
ing on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own
attorneys;” and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation.”79
Despite its sometimes-sweeping language, Miller leaves us
with a relatively constricted holding: “the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison with-
out possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”80 Yet the nar-
row holding results in broad implications for juvenile sentenc-
ing going forward, as Marsha Levick notes in the Criminal Law
Reporter:
A close reading of Kagan’s opinion suggests that the
whole may be greater than the sum of its parts. From the
outset of her opinion, Kagan made clear that the social
science and other scientific research that had informed
the court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. dic-
tated a similar outcome in Miller. Consequently, while
affording narrow specific relief, Miller still provides a
broad framework for rethinking our treatment of juvenile
offenders.81
Further, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky writes, Miller
stands apart from its juvenile sentencing counterparts in terms
of its future implications: 
At first glance, the decision seems to follow from
other recent Supreme Court decisions that have limited
the punishments imposed on juvenile offenders. But in a
key respect this case is different: previous cases prohib-
ited the imposition of certain
punishments under any circum-
stances, whereas Miller holds
only that there cannot be a
mandatory sentence. This dis-
tinction is going to matter enor-
mously and raise important




STEPS ON THE ROAD?
As is evident, the Supreme Court has been unequivocal in
its conclusions that young people are different than adults and
should be subject to different punishments. This conclusion is
especially important in light of the trend over the last few
decades to punish them similarly to adults. Numerous ques-
tions remain, however, regarding how courts and legislatures
will implement both the letter and spirit of these decisions.
While an exhaustive examination of these issues is beyond the
scope of this article, below we discuss several specific issues
that courts and legislatures are grappling with in response to
these decisions—“virtual LWOP” and decisions regarding the
sentencing options available for courts in light of Miller.83
“VIRTUAL LWOP”
In addition to those serving LWOP for crimes committed as
juveniles, many individuals are serving long sentences for non-
homicide crimes committed as juveniles and challenges have
been brought to some of these sentences in both state and fed-
eral courts under Graham. In People v. Caballero, the California
Supreme Court considered the question of whether a “110-year-
to-life sentence [for attempted murder] contravenes Graham’s
mandate against cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.”84 In concluding that it did, the California
Supreme Court drew from Graham’s assertion that the Eighth
Amendment requires a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”85
The Caballero court rejected the state’s contention that









holding . . . .
86. Id. The Court also rejected the argument that “each of defendant’s
sentences was permissible individually because each included the
possibility of parole within his lifetime.” The Court disagreed with
the state’s reading of Lockyer v. Andrade “that a juvenile offender
may receive consecutive mandatory terms exceeding his or her life
expectancy without implicating the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment,” finding instead that “the high court noted
that it has never provided specific guidance ‘in determining
whether a particular sentence for a term of years can violate the
Eighth Amendment,’ observing that it had ‘not established a clear
or consistent path for courts to follow.’” Id. at n. 3 (citing Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003)).
87. Id. at 273 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 2469).
88. Id.
89. See id. (“Because every case will be different, we will not provide
trial courts with a precise time frame for setting these future
parole hearings in a nonhomicide case. However, the sentence
must not violate the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights and
must provide him or her a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ under
Graham’s mandate.”).
90. Id.
91. 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 5,
2012) (No. 12-558).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (“(d) An application for a writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed-
ings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a deci-
sion that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court.”). 
93. Id. at 547.
94. Id. at 551.
95. Id. at 552.
96. It is worth noting that Caballero, 55 Cal. 4th 262, was decided
after Bunch, providing further support for the proposition that
Graham is applicable to virtual juvenile LWOP sentences.
97. Citing, e.g., People v. J.I.A., 196 Cal. App. 4th 393, 127 Cal. Rptr.
3d 141, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Nuñez, 195 Cal. App.
4th 414, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
“Graham’s ban on life without
parole sentences does not
apply to juvenile offenders
who commit attempted mur-
der, with its requisite intent
to kill,” as well as the state’s
view “that a cumulative sen-
tence for distinct crimes does
not present a cognizable
Eighth Amendment claim 
. . . .”86 The Court relied on
the clarification of the
Graham decision provided by the United States Supreme Court
in Miller to hold that “Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on life without parole
sentences applies to all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile
offenders, including [a] term-of-years sentence that amounts
to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence 
. . . .”87
Unlike Graham, the Caballero decision does not categorically
prohibit the possibility of incarcerating juveniles for the rest of
their lives. Instead, drawing from the language of Graham and
Miller, the decision recognizes that “the state may not deprive
[juveniles] at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in
the future.”88 With regard to procedure, the California Court
declined to implement specific sentencing guidelines for those
wishing to challenge their LWOP or de facto life sentences
going forward.89 Rather, the court ordered that juvenile lifers
“may file petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court
in order to allow the court to weigh the mitigating evidence in
determining the extent of incarceration required before parole
hearings.”90 It will then be up to the parole board to determine
if and when the juvenile will be released from prison.
Similar challenges to virtual or de facto LWOP sentences
have cropped up across the country, with different procedural
postures and with varying outcomes. In Bunch v. Smith, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case involving a
16-year-old who was convicted of robbing, kidnapping, and
raping a young woman and was sentenced to consecutive,
fixed terms totaling 89 years’ imprisonment.91
Operating under a very different standard of review from its
state-court counterparts, the Bunch court’s analysis was guided
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
which permits federal courts to grant relief on a habeas peti-
tion only where the state court has ruled in a way that is either
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished federal law.92 Here, the Bunch court held that the Ohio
Supreme Court was not unreasonable in finding Graham to be
inapplicable on the facts. Specifically, the Bunch court held that
Graham “does not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed-
term sentences for juveniles who have committed multiple
nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount
to the practical equivalent of life without parole.”93 The court
employed a narrow reading of the Graham decision, arguing
that although “Bunch’s 89-year aggregate sentence may end up
being the functional equivalent of life without parole,”94
Graham is inapplicable because “[the Graham] Court did not 
. . . consider the constitutionality of such sentences, let alone
clearly establish that they can violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.”95 Notably, the
Bunch court concluded its opinion by noting that this is not an
established area of law:96
[C]ourts across the country are split over whether
Graham bars a court from sentencing a juvenile non-
homicide offender to consecutive, fixed terms resulting
in an aggregate sentence that exceeds the defendant’s life
expectancy. Some courts have held that such a sentence
is a de facto life without parole sentence and therefore
violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Graham.97 Other
courts, however, have rejected the de facto life sentence
argument, holding that Graham only applies to juvenile
nonhomicide offenders expressly sentenced to ‘life with-
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the country, with 
. . . varying 
outcomes.
98. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012);
State v. Kasic, 228 Ariz. 228, 265 P.3d 410, 415 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2011).
99. Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552.
100. Associated Press, “US Supreme Court Sets Aside Wyoming Teen’s




101. Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, P84 (Wyo. 2012).
102. See Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 184 L. Ed. 2d 5 (U.S. 2012) (“On
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and
case remanded to the Supreme Court of Wyoming for further
consideration in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, [132 S.
Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407] (2012)”).
103. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 570 (2005)).
104. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471, n. 9 (“26 States and the Federal
Government make life without parole the mandatory (or manda-
tory minimum) punishment for some form of murder, and
would apply the relevant provision to 14-year-olds (with many
applying it to even younger defendants). In addition, life without
parole is mandatory for older juveniles in Louisiana (age 15 and
up) and Texas (age 17). See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN., Arts. 857(A),
(B) (West Supp. 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30(C),
14:30.1(B) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§
51.02(2)(A), 54.02(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2011); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.31(a) (West 2011). In many of these jurisdic-
tions, life without parole is the mandatory punishment only for
aggravated forms of murder.”). 
105. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1102(b) (mandating life sentence
for second-degree conviction); 61 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. §6137
(removing parole eligibility from murder statute).
106. See 42  Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6302 (omitting the “crime of mur-
der” from the definition of delinquent acts that are handled in
juvenile court).
107. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(2).
108. Docket No. 79 MAP 2009.
109. Docket No. 38 EAP 2012.
out parole.’98 This split demonstrates that Bunch’s expan-
sive reading of Graham is not clearly established.99
In light of the split regarding Graham’s applicability to de
facto LWOP sentences, the United States Supreme Court’s
treatment of similar cases on petitions for certiorari may pro-
vide insight on the proper reading of Graham. Consider the
recent case from Wyoming of Wyatt Bear Cloud, a 16-year-old
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison with the possibility of parole. In challenging his case on
both Graham and Miller grounds, Bear Cloud argued that
“although [he] wasn’t sentenced to serve life without parole 
. . . that was the practical effect of his sentence because his only
chance for release was commutation by a state governor.”100
The Wyoming Supreme Court found that “Bear Cloud is
afforded the possibility of parole. Rehabilitation and even
release are still possible. Accordingly, his sentence does not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment in contravention of
Wyoming’s constitution.”101 But the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Miller.102
Caballero provides a strong example of state courts embrac-
ing and reaffirming both the letter and spirit of the Graham
decision by acknowledging the unique attributes of youth and
the necessary consideration of these attributes when it comes to
sentencing children as adults. Unlike Caballero, cases like
Bunch provide only a narrow reading of the precedent and
refuse to fully adopt Graham’s mandate that children “are more
capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less
likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than
are the actions of adults.”103 Although not yet concluded, the
current posture of Bear Cloud gives some indication that merely
providing a choice between “life with” or “life without” parole
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders fails to comply with the






At the time Miller was
decided, 26 states had sentenc-
ing provisions mandating juve-
nile LWOP sentences for certain
categories of offenses, and mak-
ing such sentences applicable to
14 year-olds.104 Of those 26
states, Pennsylvania has the
highest number of people serv-
ing the sentence, with nearly 500 men and women who were
incarcerated throughout the state as children. Prior to Miller,
Pennsylvania held the distinction of mandating life imprison-
ment sentences for all first- and second-degree murder convic-
tions,105 regardless of the age of the defendant.106 Finally,
Pennsylvania is unique in that it has an extraordinarily short
time frame—60 days—for filing a petition for post-conviction
relief based on a new rule of constitutional law.107 This means
that Pennsylvania courts are among the first in the country to
consider Miller implementation. For all of these reasons,
Pennsylvania serves as a battleground for determining how
state-based implementation of the Miller decision will look.
Using Pennsylvania as a case study in this context will help to
forecast the challenges other states may face in implementing
Miller, as well as the avenues they may wish to avoid or pursue. 
After Miller was decided, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has heard arguments in two juvenile LWOP cases. At the time
of this writing, the cases remain undecided. In the first case,
Commonwealth v. Batts,108 the Court (on direct appeal) is
tasked with deciding the appropriate sentence for a 16-year-old
convicted of first-degree murder, in light of the Miller decision
and the mandatory nature of the state’s sentencing scheme. In
Commonwealth v. Cunningham,109 a second-degree murder case







and spirit of 
the Graham
decision . . . .
110. Specifically, the Pennsylvania high court ordered briefing on the
following questions: “(1) What is, as a general matter, the appro-
priate remedy on direct appeal in Pennsylvania for a defendant
who was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for a murder committed when
the defendant was under the age of eighteen?; (2) To what relief,
if any, is appellant entitled from the mandatory term of life
imprisonment without parole for the murder he committed
when he was fourteen years old?” Docket No. 79 MAP 2009.
111. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 7-8, Batts, Docket No. 79
MAP 2009.
112. See id. at 8 (“juvenile offenders convicted of first degree murder
should be resentenced in accordance with the sentencing scheme
for the lesser-included offense of third degree murder, which car-
ries a maximum term of 40 years.”) (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1102). See also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,
305-307 (1996) (finding that where a greater offense must be
reversed, courts may enter judgment on the lesser included
offense); Commonwealth v. Story, 497 Pa. 273, 275 (1981)
(imposing life imprisonment, the next most severe punishment
under Pennsylvania law, upon invalidation of mandatory death-
penalty statute as unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Bradley,
449 Pa. 19, 23-24 (1972) (vacating death sentence and imposing
life imprisonment as next most severe constitutionally available
sentence); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 488 Pa. 139, 141 (1979)
(same).
113. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant, supra note 109, at 12.
114. See Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 7, Batts, Docket No. 79
MAP 2009 (“A sentence of life in prison without parole simply
requires a discretionary decision based on individualized consid-
eration.”).
115. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 522 A.2d 1058,
1063 (Pa. 1987)).
117. See Supplemental Response Brief of District Attorney at 4,
Cunningham, Docket No. 38 EAP 2012.
on collateral review, the Court
must squarely confront the
issue of retroactivity, deter-
mining whether Miller’s man-
date applies to all of the men
and women in the state who
were sentenced as juveniles
and are currently serving life
sentences without the possi-
bility of parole. 
COMMONWEALTH V. BATTS
Qu’eed Batts was convicted of first-degree murder,
attempted murder, and aggravated assault for his role in a
gang-related shooting of two individuals in Easton,
Pennsylvania. Batts’s appeal was argued before the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the winter of 2010 and then held in
abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari in the Miller and Jackson cases. Once Miller was
decided in the summer of 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ordered supplemental briefing on the decision’s poten-
tial impact on the pending case.110 Both sides agreed that
because the Miller decision invalidated Pennsylvania’s statu-
tory sentencing scheme (mandating LWOP for any juvenile
convicted of first- or second-degree murder), Batts was entitled
to a resentencing hearing. Therefore, the question at issue is
what the new constitutional sentence should be. 
Batts argued that the Court must look to existing statutes to
determine what constitutional sentence may be imposed on
juveniles convicted of homicide.111 Batts further argued that
with Miller’s invalidation of the existing sentencing scheme,
the only constitutionally available sentence in Pennsylvania is
the sentence for the lesser-included offense of third-degree
murder, carrying a maximum term of 40 years.112 Accordingly,
in the absence of alternate legislation to be applied retroac-
tively, Batts seeks to be resentenced pursuant to the
Commonwealth’s third-degree murder statute.113
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania argued that the only
relief afforded to Batts by the Miller decision is a resentenc-
ing hearing, at which he can still be sentenced to life in
prison without parole.114 Specifically, the Commonwealth
argued that “[t]he trial court has discretion as to whether to
impose a sentence to life in prison without parole, or a sen-
tence of life in prison with the possibility of parole.”115
Underlying the Commonwealth’s argument is the notion that
juveniles do not deserve special treatment; rather, murder
should be treated “as a special category of violence that can-
not be categorically excused or mitigated by youthful
impetuosity.”116
COMMONWEALTH V. CUNNINGHAM 
Ian Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder
for the role he played in an armed-robbery-turned-murder.
Once convicted, Cunningham sought collateral relief on the
basis of the changes in law as announced in Roper. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court denied relief, holding that Roper
had no bearing on life sentences.117 Soon after the Superior
Court denied relief, Cunningham filed a petition for allowance
of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Court
reserved the petition pending the disposition of Batts. As in
Batts, following the United States Supreme Court’s announce-
ment of its decision in Miller, the Pennsylvania court issued a
limited allowance of appeal to address the extent to which
Miller applies on collateral review. The court heard oral argu-
ment on this issue in September 2012. 
Cunningham puts forward a number of arguments in sup-
port of his petition for relief. First, Cunningham challenges the
applicability of a felony-murder charge to a juvenile offender.
Relying on research regarding adolescent brain development,
Cunningham argues that it is not possible to infer intent for
felony-murder purposes when dealing with a teenage defen-
dant. Second, Cunningham argues that prisoners convicted of
first- or second-degree murder before the Miller/Jackson deci-
sions are eligible for relief even after they have exhausted their
direct-appeal rights, relying in large part on the fact that the
Miller decision was held to apply to Jackson on collateral
review. Cunningham goes on to argue that if Miller/Jackson
relief is applied retroactively, courts at resentencing must look
to the statutes in existence at the time of the offense to deter-
mine what constitutional sentence may be imposed. In








118. See Brief of Appellee at 2, Cunningham, Docket No. 38 EAP 2012.
119. 489 U.S. 288.
120. See id. at 12-13 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. 288) (“[U]nder the first
Teague exception, new rules do not apply on collateral review
unless they are ‘substantive’” and the second Teague exception
only applies to “‘watershed rules’ of criminal procedure ‘impli-
cating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pro-
ceeding.’”).
121. Id. at 14.
122. See id. at 5 (“That one of the appellants in Miller, Jackson, was
on collateral review is additionally irrelevant because Miller did
not apply its new rule to Jackson (or even to Miller), but only
remanded for further proceedings—in which the state could
raise a valid Teague objection.”).
123. Id.
124. See Chemerinsky, supra note 78 (“In fact, the Supreme Court
held that Ring [v. Arizona] did not apply retroactively. In 2004’s
Schriro v. Summerlin, the court concluded that Ring was a proce-
dural change and not a ‘watershed’ rule of criminal procedure
that warranted retroactive application”). For cases finding that
Miller does not apply retroactively on collateral review, see Craig
v. Cain, 2013 WL 69128, at *2, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 431, at *4-
*5 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (unpublished opinion) (“Miller does
not satisfy the test for retroactivity because it does not categori-
cally bar all sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles; Miller
bars only those sentences made mandatory by a sentencing
scheme.”); People v. Carp, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2012 WL 5846553,
2012 Mich. App. Lexis 2270 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012)
(“Miller does not comprise a substantive new rule and, therefore,
is not subject to retroactive application for cases on collateral
review . . . .”); Geter v. State, ___ So.3d ___, 2012 WL 4448860,
2012 Fla. App. Lexis 16051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
125. Chemerinsky, supra note 78.
126. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 2012 Ill. App. (1st) 111145, 2012
WL 6206407, 2012 Ill. App. Lexis 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(“The Miller case held under the Eighth Amendment that it is
cruel and unusual punishment to impose a mandatory life sen-
tence without parole to a special class—juveniles. It woiuld also
be cruel and unusual to apply that principle only to new cases.
We therefore hold that the Court’s holding in Miller should be
Pennsylvania, courts at resentencing should only consider
lesser-included offenses, which, in the case of felony murder,
includes only the underlying felonies.
The Commonwealth argues that Miller states a new rule and
is therefore “not a basis for relief on collateral review.”118 The
Commonwealth further argues that Miller does not meet the
exceptions required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague
v. Lane,119 to be given retroactive application. Specifically, the
rule announced by Miller does not meet the exception of being
either a “substantive” rule or “watershed rule” of criminal pro-
cedure,120 but, according to the Commonwealth, only
“impos[es] a process, [and] is restricted to the manner in
which the penalty is determined and has no bearing on the
accuracy of the conviction.”121 The Commonwealth rejects
Cunningham’s argument that Miller applies retroactively on
collateral review merely because the decision was held to apply
to Jackson.122 Finally, the Commonwealth rebuffs
Cunningham’s argument that juvenile defendants convicted of
second-degree murder should be resentenced pursuant to the
sentences available for the underlying felonies. Instead, the
Commonwealth argues, “On remand in such a case a sentenc-
ing court would have the power to allow or not allow parole,
and to define a minimum term that would initiate parole eligi-
bility.”123
BATTS AND CUNNINGHAM: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The opposing arguments presented by the petitioners and
Commonwealth in Batts and Cunningham largely portray the
range of outcomes available to state courts as they work to
implement Miller’s mandate. Speculation as to the relative mer-
its of the arguments presented in the two cases serves a limited
purpose. Instead, by combining the arguments presented by
Batts and Cunningham with additional analysis on the issue of
retroactivity and the role of sentencing legislation, the founda-
tion is laid for a comprehensive understanding of the myriad




There is currently no defin-
itive authority that specifically
addresses whether or not
Miller applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review. In
Pennsylvania, Cunningham
will likely serve this purpose.
The competing sides of the
argument are well summarized
by Professor Chemerinsky: 
There is a strong argu-
ment that Miller should
apply retroactively: It says
that it is beyond the authority of the criminal law to
impose a mandatory sentence of life without parole. It
also would be terribly unfair to have individuals impris-
oned for life without any chance of parole based on the
accident of the timing of the trial. On the other hand, if
Miller is seen as just requiring a new procedure—a
penalty phase before a sentence of life without parole is
imposed for a crime committed by a juvenile—then it is
unlikely to be applied retroactively. Procedural changes
rarely apply retroactively.124
However, he concludes, “the Miller court did more than
change procedures; it held that the government cannot consti-
tutionally impose a punishment. As a substantive change in
the law which puts matters outside the scope of the govern-
ment’s power, the holding should apply retroactively.”125
Chemerinsky’s apt conclusion has considerable support.126 The
new rule announced by the Miller decision was held to apply
to both Evan Miller on direct appeal and Kuntrell Jackson on
collateral review. Presumably, if Miller did not apply retroac-
tively to cases on collateral review, Jackson would have been
barred from the relief he was granted. 











retroactively applied.”); People v. Morfin, 2012 Ill. App. (1st)
103568, 2012 WL 6028634, 2012 Ill. App. Lexis 977 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012) (“Miller creates a new rule of law that was not required
by either the precedents on what penalties a minor constitution-
ally cannot receive (Roper and Graham) or by the cases cited in
Miller requiring sentencing discretion for the death penalty.”);
State v. Simmons, 99 So.3d 28 (La. 2012) (finding Miller to apply
retroactively to a case where crime was committed in 1995); see
also People v. Hoffman, 2012 WL 3066392, 2012 Cal. App.
Unpub. Lexis 5574 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2012) (unpublished
opinion); Iowa v. Lockheart, 2012 WL 2814378 (Iowa Ct. App.
2012) (unpublished opinion) (remainding for resentencing in
accord with Miller without employing the Teague analysis).
Support for Miller’s retroactivity also exists in light of the retroac-
tive application of Graham, which has been treated differently in
state courts across the country. The U.S. Supreme Court has not
spoken on the matter. For cases finding Graham to apply retroac-
tively, see, e.g., Louisiana v. Skipper, 2011 WL 2448013 (La.
App.); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W. 2d. 697 (Iowa 2010). For the
opposing viewpoint, see, e.g., Selectman v. Zavaras, 2011 WL
1597678 (D. Colo. 2011); Trimble v. Triani, 2011 WL 3426207
(D. Colo. 2011). At the time of this writing, only one federal cir-
cuit court had addressed the issue. See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258
(5th Cir. 2011) (finding Graham to apply retroactively).
127. 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001) (“The new rule becomes retroactive,
not by the decisions of the lower court, or by the combined
action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but simply by
the actions of the Supreme Court”). See also Teague, 489 U.S. at
300 (“[O]nce a new rule is applied to a defendant in the case
announcing the new rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”).
128. See note 126, supra (considering the retroactive application of
the Graham decision). In In re Sparks, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found, “By the combined effect of the holding of
Graham itself and the first Teague exception, Graham was there-
fore made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court
as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler.” Sparks, 657 F.3d at
260 (citing Tyler, 533 U.S. 656, n. 31). 
129. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the exe-
cution of mentally retarded offenders); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (out-
lawing the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (banning LWOP sentences for
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses).
130. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Lockett v. Ohio, 483 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 436
U.S. 921 (1978), and Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
131. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2480 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
132. The hearing, convened by Senator Stewart Greenleaf on July 12,
2012, allowed for testimony from stakeholders on all sides of the
issue. See Matt Stroud and Liliana Segura, The Uncertain Fate of
Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Lifers, THE NATION, Aug. 7, 2012,
http://www.thenation.com/article/169268/uncertain-fate-
pennsylvanias-juvenile-lifers# (“The hearing featured testimony
from twenty-six people—none of them prisoners—who advocate
for organizations, litigate juvenile cases or are otherwise
involved in the juvenile lifer debate”).
133. See Pennsylvania General Assembly, “Bill Information, Regular
Session 2011-2012, Senate Bill 850,” available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/BillInfo.cfm?syear=2
011&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=850.
Under the Court’s prior
ruling in Tyler v. Cain,127 and
because the Miller Court
reversed Jackson’s sentence,
a strong argument can be
made that the ban on
mandatory LWOP is retroac-
tive. Specifically, in Miller,
the majority relies on two
lines of precedent that have
largely been held to apply
retroactively themselves.128
As discussed above in the
explication of the Miller decision, the first line of cases relied
on by the Court adopted categorical bans on sentencing
schemes where the severity of the punishment far outweighed
the blameworthiness of a class of offenders.129 The second line
of cases consists of those requiring individualized sentencing
hearings with consideration of mitigating factors before a sen-
tence of death may be imposed.130 Because cases under both
lines of precedent have been applied retroactively on collateral
and direct review, it follows that Miller should receive the
same retroactive application. Finally, the Miller dissent specif-
ically bemoans the majority’s invalidation of over 2,000
cases.131 The dissent would not have raised such a concern if
the Court’s new ruling did not apply retroactively.
LEGISLATIVE FIXES—THE PENNSYLVANIA STORY
In the wake of the Miller decision, state courts were left with
little guidance on implementation. In states like Pennsylvania,
the decision invalidated an entire statutory sentencing provi-
sion, leaving no sentence on the books for youth under 18 con-
victed of first- or second-degree murder. Pennsylvania is
primed to serve as a case study not only in the litigation con-
text, as described above, but also in terms of its legislative reac-
tion to Miller.
Responding to uncertainty among the lower courts, the
Pennsylvania legislature acted hastily. The chair of the senate
judiciary committee convened a hearing approximately three
weeks after the Miller decision was issued.132 The legislature
then convened a truncated three-week-long session in
September 2012, during which a number of legislative amend-
ments were introduced. One of these amendments, to Senate
Bill 850, sought to overhaul the first- and second-degree mur-
der sentencing schemes for juveniles, in direct response to
Miller. The amended bill provides for the following revised sen-
tencing scheme: 
For first degree murder, either: life without the
opportunity for parole; or 35 years to life for individuals
who were 15 to 17 years old at the time of the offense or
25 years to life for those who were 14 or younger at the
time of the offense. For second degree murder: 30 years
to life for youth who were 15 to 17 years old at the time
of the offense and 20 years to life for youth who were 14
or under at the time of the offense. Parole hearings are
only guaranteed to occur every five years following com-
pletion of the minimum term of years.133
Because cases
under both lines of
precedent have
been applied
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134. See, e.g., Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, Press
Release: District Attorneys Praise PA Legislature for End of Session




(“The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA)
praised the Pennsylvania State Senate and House of
Representatives for using their final session days to focus on
criminal justice and public safety matters . . . . The new laws
provide appropriate sentences for juveniles convicted of murder.
. . .”).
135. See, e.g., Antonio Ginatta, US/Pennsylvania: Don’t Codify
Excessive Sentences for Children Letter to Pennsylvania Governor
Tom Corbett, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 19, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/19/uspennsylvania-dont-
codify-excessive-sentences-children (“There is no doubt that
thoughtful, informed sentencing reform is needed in
Pennsylvania. Senate Bill 850 is neither thoughtful nor suffi-
ciently informed.”).
136. See Pennsylvania General Assembly, Floor Roll Call, Bill
Information, Regular Session 2011-2012, Senate Bill 850, available
at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill_votes.cfm?
syear=2011&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=850.
137. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Corbett Signs Juvenile Murder Sentence
Legislation, Oct. 26, 2012, available at http://www.philly.com/
philly/news/pennsylvania/175897601.html.
138. See Senate Bill 635/S.L. 2012-148, “Minors/Sentencing for First
Degree Murder.”
139. See Juvenile Justice Blog, States Respond to Supreme Court JLWOP
Decision, July 19, 2012, http://juvenilejusticeblog.web.unc.edu/
2012/07/17/states-respond-to-supreme-court-jlwop-decision/. 
140. The mitigating factors to be considered by the sentencing court
include: age at the time of the offense, immaturity, ability to
appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct, intellec-
tual capacity, prior record, mental health, familial or peer pres-
sure exerted upon the defendant, and likelihood that the defen-
dant would benefit from rehabilitation in confinement. See note
138, supra.
141. CA Senate Bill 9, available at http://legiscan.com/gaits/
text/665299.
142. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Jerry Brown OKs Appeal for Minors




The amendments garnered support among prosecutors and
victims’ advocates.134 While child advocates and families and
supporters of juvenile lifers applauded the removal of LWOP as
a sentencing option for those convicted of second-degree mur-
der, they strongly criticized the legislature for failing to take a
measured and thoughtful approach to one of the most sub-
stantive changes to this area of the sentencing statute in nearly
a century. Opponents disagreed with leaving LWOP on the
table for first-degree murder and argued the mandatory mini-
mums were at odds with the directives of Miller, which calls
for an individualized approach to juvenile sentencing, taking
into account the transitory nature of youth.135 With little time
for opponents to mount an organized campaign against the
proposed legislation, the Bill passed on concurrence by a vote
of 37 to 12. Notably, the vote was not split across party or geo-
graphic lines. Representatives on both sides of the aisle voiced
discontent with the way the legislation was pushed through
the process.136 The Bill was signed into law by Governor
Corbett on October 25, 2012.137
The interplay between the legislature’s actions and the
pending Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in Batts and
Cunningham is complex on a number of levels. First, the legis-
lature failed to address the issue of Miller’s retroactivity and
what is to become of the nearly 500 men and women who are
currently serving illegal sentences, leaving the issue for the
state’s highest court to address in Cunningham. Second, the leg-
islature can enact future laws to circumvent the high court’s
pending rulings in Batts and Cunningham. Third, advocates
may mount constitutional challenges to the form and sub-
stance of the current legislation, thereby sending the issues
back to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for consideration. 
OTHER APPROACHES—NORTH CAROLINA,
CALIFORNIA, AND IOWA
To date, only a handful of other states have taken on the
task of amending their laws in
accordance with Miller. In
North Carolina, outgoing
Governor Bev Perdue signed
into law an amendment to the
state sentencing laws on first-
degree murder to comply with
Miller.138 Under the new law,
“life with parole” means that
defendants will be eligible for
parole at 25 years imprison-
ment and that parole will be a
term of 5 years.139 Further, juveniles convicted under the
felony-murder doctrine are afforded a life-with-parole sen-
tence. The law also outlines the hearing procedure to deter-
mine whether the juvenile’s sentence should be life with or
without parole, and specifies the mitigating factors to be con-
sidered by the court at such a hearing.140
California’s approach reflects a progressive view on juvenile
sentencing. Following a legislative campaign that was put into
place well before the Miller decision was announced, the gov-
ernor recently signed into law SB9,141 which grants juvenile
offenders sentenced to life in prison without parole that have
served at least 15 years the chance to petition for a new sen-
tence. The courts would then have the ability to lower their
sentence to 25 years to life if the juvenile offenders demon-
strate remorse and work toward rehabilitation.142
Iowa, on the other hand, provides an example of a conserv-
ative non-participatory approach. Instead of allowing the leg-
islative process to take its course, the governor of Iowa used
his executive privilege to commute life sentences for 38 pris-
oners sentenced to juvenile LWOP to mandatory 60-year sen-
tences, acquiring a good deal of national attention and derision
as a result. While the Iowa Code seems to give the governor
this power without limitation, an open question will be
To date, only a
handful of other
states have 
taken on the 
task of amending
their laws in 
accordance 
with Miller.
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whether 60-year sentences are functionally “life” sentences,
given that these prisoners were at least 13 or 14 at the time of
the offense.143
CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has laid out a clear
rationale for punishing juveniles differently than adults and
has used this framework, in large part, to ban specific punish-
ments for young people. These decisions are not only sup-
ported by prior precedent and common-sense judgment, but
also by substantial research from the social and medical sci-
ences as well as the overwhelming consensus of the world
community. Courts and legislatures will continue to grapple
with these decisions as they seek to directly implement the
Graham and Miller holdings and consider how these decisions
might apply to other sentences for juveniles.
Discussions regarding the appropriate implementation of
these decisions will dominate the dialogue on juvenile justice
for years to come. In these discussions, it is essential that advo-
cates and lawmakers be loyal to the true letter and spirit of the
Miller decision. State actors must develop and implement com-
prehensive reforms to their statutory sentencing schemes,
rather than surface solutions merely removing the word
“mandatory” from otherwise harsh options not in line with
Miller’s directive. Enacting sentencing schemes that require
sentences of 60, or even 35 years before a young person is eli-
gible for parole are examples of the type of reaction that might
technically comply with the letter but not the spirit of the
Graham and Miller decisions. 
Comprehensive reform must also focus not merely on juve-
niles serving long sentences. As discussed previously, the vast
majority of young people in the criminal justice system do not
receive long sentences, and the evidence indicates that the
policies that have facilitated the increased transfer of young
people have failed. This means that legislatures and courts
must revisit the purpose of transferring juveniles to the crimi-
nal court and determine whether mechanisms that do so are
actually distinguishing between those who should be trans-
ferred and those who should not. Consideration of this ques-
tion must move beyond charged rhetoric concerning the dan-
gerousness of young people and focus on the framework laid
out by the Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller. Doing so will
not only benefit young people, but will also serve public safety
and ensure that we are utilizing financial and other resources
appropriately.     
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